Reform Through Rulemaking? by Marcus, Richard L.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 3 Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference: Litigation in a Free Society 
2002 
Reform Through Rulemaking? 
Richard L. Marcus 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 901 (2002). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/11 
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFORM THROUGH RULEMAKING? 
RICHARD L. MARCUS∗ 
During what has been called the “Golden Age of Rulemaking,”1 giants 
trod the soil of rulemaking. Drawing from the legacy of Jeremy Bentham, 
David Dudley Field, and Roscoe Pound, a small band of drafters created the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the late 1930s and changed the American 
procedural landscape. Their reforms included completing Field’s effort to 
bury technical pleading requirements2 and adopting a revolutionary set of 
discovery provisions.3 More recently, the federal rulemakers’ 1966 revision 
of the class action rule has had at least revolutionary consequences, 
sometimes in the teeth of what the rulemakers said they wanted it to do.4 
Altogether, these giants are seen to have accomplished “a major triumph 
of law reform”5 that “transformed civil litigation [and] . . . reshaped civil 
procedure.”6 Beyond that, “they have influenced procedural thinking in every 
court in this land . . . and indeed have become part of the consciousness of 
lawyers, judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of 
 ∗  Horace O. Coil (‘57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law. This Article was presented at the Litigation in a Free Society Conference in Hollywood, Fla., on 
March 16, 2002. I am indebted to Vince Moyer of the Hastings Law Library for locating a number of 
hard-to-find sources. 
  1. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 897 (1999) (section entitled “The Golden Age 
of Rulemaking”); see also Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989) 
(referring to the “golden age of federal civil procedure”). A different image is suggested by Paul 
Carrington—that into the 1960s the rulemaking power was still in its “honeymoon stage.” See Paul 
Carrington & Derek Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy 
of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 AZ. L. REV. 461, 490 (1997). 
  2. See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749 (1998) (evaluating the continuing efforts of the federal courts to develop an appropriate attitude 
toward scrutinizing pleadings under the 1938 pleading reforms); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of 
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439-51 (1986) 
(tracing the evolution of pleading rules). 
  3. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 736 (1998) (referring to “the discovery revolution”). 
  4. See Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2009 (2000) 
(discussing possible amendments to Rule 23 to deal with uses to which class actions had been put 
under the 1966 revision of the rule); Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform 
Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995) (discussing the ramifications of aggressive use of Rule 
23 in mass tort litigation). 
  5. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237 (1989). 
  6. Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 233 
(1998). See also id. at 248, reporting that the Civil Rules were “surely the single most substantial 
procedural reform in U.S. history.” 
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judicial procedure.”7 We are even told that they “became a means of 
transforming the modes of judging.”8 It is thus not surprising that these 
revolutionary changes have become the heart of the modern civil procedure 
course in law schools, so that most American law students start learning 
about how lawsuits are handled by studying them. After they graduate, they 
continue to labor in the shadow of these reforms. Most states have adopted 
procedural rule provisions that mirror the Federal Rules,9 and even in states 
that have persisted in alternative procedural provisions, the pleading, 
discovery, and class action innovations of the Federal Rules have made their 
mark. 
Although one can question whether there really was a causal relationship 
between rule changes and the transformation of litigation,10 given this 
experience, it is understandable that one familiar with the broad consensus 
that rulemaking worked such a change in the past would look now to 
  7. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1989). 
  8. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 934 (2000). 
  9. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State 
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) (examining the widespread copying 
of the Federal Rules in state court systems). 
  10. Judge Patrick Higginbotham, one of the commentators on this paper during the Litigation in a 
Free Society Conference, raised legitimate questions about justifications for the widespread consensus 
that rule changes had propelled a litigation metamorphosis. He made at least two fundamental points 
that should be noted. 
 First, Judge Higginbotham pointed out that some central elements of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure reforms had important antecedents in the Field Code of the mid-nineteenth century. So in 
terms of effecting “revolutionary” changes in procedure, one can at least debate whether the changes 
were actually so large, or merely carried through what Field had attempted more than 80 years earlier. 
It is surely true that these reforms did not all spring from nowhere into the rulemakers’ minds. But see 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Context, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 932 (1987) (asserting that the Field Code was “not, 
contrary to its usual portrayal, a parent of the Federal Rules”). In any event, it does seem that at least 
some of the changes constituted a clear break with the Field Code. See Subrin, supra note 3 
(describing the Civil Rules’ discovery provisions as “revolutionary”). 
 Second, and more importantly, Judge Higgenbotham suggested reasons for questioning the 
widespread assumption that the rules themselves propelled litigation changes. Certainly the relaxation 
of previous procedural tethers contributed to what followed, but it may well not have been a primary 
cause. Forces beyond the rulemakers’ control, such as the growing importance of public law litigation, 
actually were central to several distinctive features of contemporary American civil litigation. Hence, 
the experience with the Civil Rules may not provide a ground for thinking that rule changes can cause 
such a transformation because the midcentury metamorphosis could represent only the coincidence of 
rulemaking and changes that were brought about by extraneous factors. 
 It is fascinating to try to unravel cause and effect in this area, and this Article does not attempt to 
do so concerning the midcentury transformation. Instead, it proceeds from the starting point of the 
popular version of what the rulemakers did then and considers what the rulemakers can do now. If 
Judge Higginbotham is right, the rulemakers of the past may have been no more capable of sparking 
fundamental reform than the rulemakers of today. 
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rulemaking as the method for further reforms to address the challenges of 
21st century litigation. However, as the diffidence in the title of this Article 
suggests, it is not at all clear that such reform can come from this source. 
Perhaps the pervasive and longstanding effect of the original Rules 
resulted from the intellectual capacity and fortitude of the federal rulemakers 
themselves. Charles Clark, at least, implied that self-confidence was central 
to the drafting effort he led as Reporter to the committee that produced the 
original Federal Rules when he urged that “reformers must follow their 
dream and leave compromises to others.”11 It is difficult to find similar 
confidence welling in the hearts of contemporary rulemakers.12 It is 
particularly difficult to find any enthusiasm for any undertaking that might be 
deemed “revolutionary,” or perhaps even aggressive. 
To the contrary, what one hears about rulemaking is that it is caught in a 
period of crisis. Reflecting on recent reform efforts, this paper therefore 
evaluates the prospects for future reform from this quarter. It begins by 
invoking three perspectives that might inform that inquiry and then 
elaborates on various themes of crisis that have been heard over the past 
twenty years. Against that background, it examines some features and 
episodes of recent rulemaking, partly from the perspective of an insider.13 
Despite the pervasive and valid concerns about a crisis in rulemaking, it 
concludes that some modest reform is possible, and that rulemaking’s 
inability to deliver revolutionary change may not be a bad thing. Indeed, it 
may be that the latitude accorded the giants of rulemaking was something of 
an anomaly in American legal history. 
I. THREE PERSPECTIVES 
As is so often true in academia, it seems useful to begin with three 
perspectives to frame our inquiry. The first perspective examines the initial 
clarion call to respond to the rulemaking crisis, Professor Friedenthal’s 1975 
article announcing that the congressional interception and revision of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence showed that a “contemporary crisis” had arisen 
  11. Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, Two Decades of the 
Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 448 (1958). 
  12. Cf. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 
(1986) (arguing that procedural innovations of 1970s and 1980s represented loss of faith in 
adjudication and consequent enthusiasm for other means of resolving cases, such as alternative dispute 
resolution). 
  13. Since 1996, I have had the privilege of serving as Special Reporter to the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules and worked on its review of discovery and class action rules. In this Article, 
I speak only for myself and in no way for the Committee. 
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concerning the Supreme Court’s rulemaking power.14 
Professor Friedenthal began by endorsing rulemaking as “a means of 
obtaining meaningful and necessary reform of antiquated procedural rules 
that can otherwise be altered only through legislation.”15 Until rather 
recently, the results of this rulemaking had been “spectacular,” in part 
because similar improvement could not have been obtained by legislation “in 
the face of opposition from trial attorneys.”16 Judges, who are freer from 
political pressures than members of Congress, are thus able to make the 
needed reforms in their role as rulemakers. 
But the remarkable success of reform via rulemaking had been thrown 
into jeopardy, Friedenthal warned, by the flaws of the proposed Evidence 
Rules. At the root of the problem, he thought, was the increased distance 
between the Supreme Court and the rulemakers, as the drafts of proposed 
changes were filtered through various committees and the Judicial 
Conference before they reached the Court. Until 1956, the Court had 
reviewed the rulemakers’ work rather directly. But in that year, Chief Justice 
Warren discharged the committee, which had been in relatively continuous 
existence since 1936, and the rule revision process ground to a temporary 
halt. Under what has been called the “Queen Mary Compromise,”17 the 
solution that emerged was that Congress should direct by statute that 
rulemaking be presided over by the Judicial Conference. 
Due to this new arrangement, Friedenthal thought, the Court simply was 
not supervising the rulemaking process closely enough. More particularly, 
the failings of the Evidence Rules, and to a lesser extent the 1970 
amendments to the discovery provisions of the Civil Rules, resulted from 
both the incompleteness of the Advisory Committee’s consideration of the 
amendments and its tendency to insert new provisions after the public 
comment period had closed.18 In the case of the Evidence Rules, “the Court’s 
utter reliance on the discretion of a drafting committee ended in disaster.”19 
  14. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975). 
  15. Id. 
  16. Id. at 674. 
  17. See Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking, A Report from the Subcommittee on Long 
Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685-86 (1995) (describing discussions of Chief 
Justice Warren, Justice Tom Clark, and Chief Judge John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals during their trip on the Queen Mary to the 1957 American Bar Association (ABA) 
Convention as the source of the 1958 legislation that created the current statutory apparatus). See 28 
U.S.C. § 331 (2000). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2002) (directing the Judicial Conference to 
establish a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure). 
  18. See Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 677. 
 
  19. Id. at 685. 
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What was needed, he felt, was to “restore to the Court the full rulemaking 
powers it previously enjoyed.”20 If the Court continued to be a “mere 
conduit” for the work of others,21 the era of effective reform was over. 
Friedenthal’s goal, then, was to ensure that giants would continue to 
manage and direct the rulemaking process so that the legacy of reform from 
the era of Charles Clark could be preserved. Both as a matter of content and 
as a matter of form, he felt that substantive involvement by Supreme Court 
Justices was key to achieving these goals and that Congress would become 
more active unless that occurred. Should Congress become more active in 
reviewing or initiating procedural change, rulemaking would no longer offer 
the promise of reform. 
Quite a different perspective on procedural reform has recently been 
suggested by Professor Leubsdorf, who reflects on what he calls “the myth of 
civil procedure reform.”22 This myth, he explains, has been conceived and 
purveyed by civil procedure teachers in this country, including him, who 
have indoctrinated their students, the American bar of today.23 The problem 
is that there is no solid evidence that reform has actually made any 
difference, prompting Leubsdorf to “propose a counter-myth”: “[T]he great 
reforms had little or no impact on the speed or cost of the average civil 
action.”24 
This perspective calls into question the whole thrust of the notion that 
rulemaking giants have in the past transformed American civil procedure. In 
part, that misgiving is due to unresolved disagreements about the goal sought 
to be achieved—reducing cost, speeding disposition, improving accuracy, or 
fostering litigant satisfaction, for example25—and, in part, it is due to the 
difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of procedures in achieving some of 
these goals. For example, “it is virtually impossible to assess accuracy.”26 On 
some points, there is some evidence that weakens the claim that procedural 
change has achieved the goals it sought to accomplish. The duration of cases, 
for example, decreased in the federal courts from 1900 until about 1942, 
when it averaged less than one year, and then it rose slowly until 1980, when 
  20. Id. at 675. 
  21. Id. at 685. 
  22. John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 53 (A.A.S. 
Zuckerman ed., 1999). 
  23. See id. Professor Leubsdorf acknowledges that his own book on civil procedure, coauthored 
with Professors James and Hazard, is one of the props of the myth. See id. at 53 n.1. 
  24. Id. at 63. 
  25. See id. at 54-56. 
  26. Id. at 55. 
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it hovered around one year.27 That statistic hardly shows that the adoption of 
the Civil Rules in 1938 produced a strong positive effect in terms of speedy 
justice. 
Despite his counter-myth, Professor Leubsdorf eventually assures us that 
“many procedural changes do make many differences some good and some 
bad.”28 But that is not an entirely cheerful affirmation, as “it is hard to tell 
what change will make what difference,”29 and many will “find it hard to 
believe that all changes labelled ‘reform’ necessarily move in a desirable 
direction.”30 So both the efficacy and desirability of reform are debatable. 
The third perspective invokes a peculiarly American phenomenon of 
“adversarial legalism,” as explored by Professor Kagan, who is both a lawyer 
and a political scientist.31 Adversarial legalism describes the tendency of 
Americans to resolve political and social issues in a rights-based, dispute-
oriented format. Professor Kagan’s focus is much broader than the 
rulemaking process, for it employs “a sociolegal, comparative, and political 
perspective” to examine adversarial legalism.32 His starting point is to 
appreciate that, “compared to other economically advanced democracies, 
American civil life is more deeply penetrated by legal conflict and by 
controversy about legal processes.”33 This orientation is reflected in our 
methods of dealing with an array of problems such as combatting crime, 
compensating injured people, regulating securities markets, and addressing 
environmental concerns. In most other countries, that sort of activity is 
principally controlled by government through a system of social insurance or 
by “corporatist” enforcement bureaucracies. “By viewing these different 
legal spheres holistically,” Kagan reasons, “it becomes clear that the different 
streams of the American legal process share a common set of 
characteristics.”34 
The critical distinction is that this country is peculiarly resistant to 
centralized power even though it expects a great deal of government: 
American adversarial legalism, therefore, can be viewed as arising 
from a fundamental tension between two powerful elements: first, a 
political culture (or set of popular attitudes) that expects and demands 
  27. See id. at 63-64. 
  28. Id. at 65. 
  29. Id. at 66. 
  30. Id. 
  31. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). 
  32. See id. at 5. 
  33. Id. at 3. 
  34. Id. at 5. 
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comprehensive governmental protections from serious harm, injustice, 
and environmental dangers—and hence a powerful, activist 
government—and, second, a set of governmental structures that 
reflect mistrust of a concentrated power and hence that limit and 
fragment political and governmental authority.35 
The branch of government that provides aggressive protection but 
diffused authority is the court system, which Kagan characterizes as “the 
most politically and socially responsive court system in the world.”36 
Although many denounce American “litigiousness,” therefore, it is actually a 
consequence of “deeply entrenched political roots.”37 The court system, 
which operates on a “coordinate model,” diffuses authority and allows 
individual judicial officers great latitude.38 In part because they are politically 
selected, American judges feel more independent, and act more 
pragmatically in dealing with established legal rules, finding it easier to 
develop new legal responses than judges in other contemporary 
democracies.39 Similarly, broad concepts of standing afford many access to 
the judicial machinery to assert their rights. 
In this light, the American tendency to litigate about topics that are 
handled without litigation in other societies is not pathological, but rather a 
logical consequence of the American method of providing activist 
government without a centralized bureaucracy. On the positive side, it can 
provide remarkable protections on the initiative of a few, including the 
dispossessed; those who champion the remedial potential of adversary 
legalism are right. But it also has negative potential since it gives broad 
opportunities for self-interested actors to go to court and prevent promising 
governmental activity or reform.40 Moreover, the uncertainty and cost of 
adversarial legalism may often frustrate the assertion of rights. Thus, there 
are two faces of adversarial legalism, but those who address reform in 
American litigation tend to speak only about the favorable or unfavorable 
features. Indeed, some who challenge the overbroad assertions of critics of 
American adversary legalism seem unwilling to acknowledge the system’s 
drawbacks, perhaps for fear of lending support to political action that would 
  35. Id. at 15. 
  36. Id. at 16. 
  37. Id. at 6. 
  38. See id. at 99 (citing MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 
(1986)). 
  39. Id. at 112-13. 
  40. See id. at 25-33, illustrating the “pathologies of adversary legalism” with the tale of the 
necessary dredging of the Port of Oakland, California, which was frustrated by long delays and greatly 
enhanced costs due to litigation by disparate opponents. 
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overreact to these problems.41 
For our purposes, the key point is that it would not seem likely that the 
process of litigation in this country would be regulated by “bureaucratic 
legalism,” which emphasizes “uniform implementation of centrally devised 
rules.”42 Instead, the process of making process might be expected to be 
pervaded by the techniques of adversarial legalism. This tendency, in turn, 
might have been expected to intensify in recent decades because “the 
adversarial legalism that has pervaded the United States in the last few 
decades is both more extensive and more intense than that of the nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth.”43 
Thus, the three perspectives, sketched with too much generality and a 
tendency to force them into a mold suitable to this Article’s focus, can be 
taken to suggest different reactions to the prospects of rulemaking to achieve 
effective reform. Professor Friedenthal focuses on the great value of 
expertise and centralization, which he feared was being lost, and the resulting 
inability of the rulemakers of the future to achieve the signal gains 
accomplished by their forbearers. Professor Leubsdorf, on the other hand, 
questions the assumption that great strides really had been made, at least for 
most cases, and suggests that further reform might therefore be viewed with 
skepticism. Professor Kagan’s more general view of the American 
governmental arrangement, on the other hand, would seem to predict 
increased controversy, contentiousness about any reform efforts, and 
increasing centrifugal forces. 
II. THE CURRENT RULEMAKING “CRISIS” 
With those perspectives in mind, we may turn our attention briefly to the 
widely-reported crisis in rulemaking. Professor Friedenthal may have been 
one of the first to ring the tocsin, but he was surely not the last to announce 
that a crisis had descended on the rulemaking enterprise. Within six years, 
Professor Friedenthal was denouncing proposals for further rule changes as 
  41. See id. at 5. 
Many lawyers and sociolegal scholars view complaints about law and litigation in the Untied 
States as exaggerated or, more pointedly, as the laments of conservatives who resent legal changes 
that help the disadvantaged. But the sociolegal scholars’ defense of the American legal system, I 
suspect, also reflects a political concern: to acknowledge the system’s defects, they fear, may 
encourage politicians to enact reforms that would throw out the baby of justice along with the 
bathwater of legal excess. The concern is understandable, but refusal to recognize the unique and 
problematic features of the American legal system may ultimately endanger the baby even more. 
Id. at 5 (citation omitted). 
  42. Id. at 11. 
  43. Id. at 36. 
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“political.”44 More generally, for academics (probably the only people who 
would spend a lot of time worrying about such things), the crisis idea seems 
to be the new canon so far as rulemaking is concerned. Of course, as I have 
noted in the past, calling something a crisis is a good way of getting attention 
to support a change.45 Claimed crises of various sorts partly explain the 1934 
decision to delegate rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court. 
Another thing that academics are good at doing is questioning widely 
accepted views. So perhaps we might question this crisis mentality. At a 
minimum, we could raise some questions about whether the “Golden Age of 
Rulemaking” really was Nirvana. Professor Bone says that this period lasted 
from 1950 until 1970,46 but some might raise questions about whether it 
really lasted until 1970. Professor Friedenthal, for example, thought that the 
problem started in the mid-1950s when Chief Justice Warren discharged the 
original Civil Rules Committee.47 Friedenthal also thought that the work 
product of the later committee, reviewed by the Judicial Conference, fell 
short of the work of the giants. He strongly criticized aspects of the 1970 
amendments to the discovery rules, which he attributed to the inattention of 
the Supreme Court.48 So Friedenthal would end the period in 1955, a rather 
short golden age if it only started in 1950. The starting date should probably 
be put earlier, for it was during the 1930s that the giants of rulemaking 
rewrote the American procedural landscape. 
If having a big effect—achieving pervasive reform—is the measure of a 
golden age, the claim for that period is a strong one. All of us must concede 
that those giants accomplished an amazing thing. They revised procedure 
stem to stern and set it on a different course, one that probably assisted in the 
later vitality of what Professor Kagan calls adversarial legalism. Indeed, 
some may think that the giants’ accomplishments were so momentous that 
there simply should not have been any more rulemaking.49 Maybe the Queen 
Mary Compromise should not have been reached, and the existing rules, 
including the tinkering during their first decade and a half of existence, 
  44. See Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 813-15 (1981) (characterizing as political the 
argument of Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist that proposed discovery amendments were 
insufficient to deal with discovery problems). 
  45. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 762-63 (1993). 
  46. See Bone, supra note 1, at 897. 
  47. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
  48. See Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 677-82 (discussing asserted deficiencies in the work-
product provisions of the 1970 amendments). 
  49. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 761 (citing lawyer who rued the creation of rule committees 
who kept changing the rules). 
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should be left intact as a procedural Bible for American litigation. 
But at least the uncharitable might raise questions about whether the 
Golden Age should be viewed as quite so golden. Giving such power to a 
small group made up of several law professors and a number of very 
prominent lawyers might not sit well as a general matter. Not even any sitting 
judges were included in the mix. And a fair argument can be made for the 
idea that judges could be expected to be less attuned to client interests than 
lawyers.50 (Law professors, of course, are the purest of the pure.) We are told 
that these rulemakers extensively consulted with others about what they were 
doing,51 but one cannot resist the urge to suspect that this interaction was less 
intense than what is now necessary with regard to much more modest 
rulemaking efforts. One could also wonder at (and about) the extent to which 
the rulemakers of the Golden Age were seemingly willing to put aside their 
possible self-interests, or those of their clients—the broadening of discovery 
and the 1966 expansion of the class action rule seem to be cases in point. 
So as we survey the changed circumstances of rulemaking in the present, 
we should not forget the sorts of questions that might have been raised about 
what happened during the Golden Age. Notwithstanding those questions, 
there is wide agreement that rulemaking has fallen onto seriously hard times, 
and that reform would therefore be much harder to accomplish via 
rulemaking. Charles Alan Wright thus reported in 1994 that he was 
“gloomier about the status of the rulemaking process than I had ever been.”52 
Professor Subrin has described “a procedural regime that is in question and in 
decline, if not in its death throes.”53 Professor Bone says that “today the court 
  50. Whether judges should simply be viewed as another interest group in the rulemaking process 
can be debated. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of 
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (exploring thesis that, as rulemakers, judges could be 
expected to pursue their own self interests) with Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and 
Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (questioning Macey’s thesis). 
  51. Thus, as the rules were being introduced at public events sponsored by the ABA in 1938, 
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, then President of the ABA, said that the members of the Advisory Committee 
“very wisely called on the Bar to help them,” and that the resulting rules were “the result of 
cooperation of a large number of lawyers.” See American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Institute 
on Federal Rules, Cleveland, Ohio, 178 (1938). William D. Mitchell, the Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee, emphasized that they were “not the work of a star chamber commission.” Id. at 189. See 
also Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1658 
(1995) (asserting that the original Advisory Committee “widely circulated proposed drafts to the bench 
and bar for comment”). 
  52. Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 9 
(1994) (focusing largely on the inclusion of opt-out rights in the 1993 amendments, permitting districts 
to secede from certain federal rules). 
  53. Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an 
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 311 (1988). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/11
p901 Marcus book pages.doc1/13/2003   1:06 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] REFORM THROUGH RULEMAKING? 911 
 
 
 
 
 
rulemaking model is under siege.”54 Professor Mullenix foresees that the 
Advisory Committee might go “the way of the French Aristocracy.”55 
Professor Walker sees “the most serious challenge to the procedural status 
quo since the adoption of the original Federal Rules in 1938.”56 Professor 
Friedenthal’s tocsin thus has now been rung by a lot of others, as well. 
But there is less agreement on what the crisis is. Professor Geyh, who 
worked with the House Judiciary Committee during part of this period, says 
that there has been “a startling transformation of the judiciary’s role” due to 
the more active role of Congress since the presentation of the Evidence 
Rules.57 Professor Burbank describes this development as the loss of the 
judiciary’s monopoly power over procedure.58 Professor Yeazell sees the 
problem as isolation of the rulemakers, who are now mostly judges, from the 
consumers of court services, the lawyers.59 These difficulties are 
compounded, he urges, by “procedure’s very own twelve-step program,”60 
the elaborate ritual required to adopt a change to the rules, and he laments 
that “[i]t requires more steps to amend a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure than 
it does to amend the U.S. Constitution.”61 Professor Walker argues that the 
true explanation is the end of the New Deal, with its reliance on technocratic 
expertise and centralization.62 
There is also room for debate about whether the crisis arose because of 
factors internal to rulemaking. Professor Friedenthal saw the problem as 
largely structural, resulting from the end of the Supreme Court’s direct 
supervisory role.63 Professor Walker, on the other hand, attributes the current 
situation to a “[m]ajor change in political structure and practice” in the last 
quarter of the 20th century as the New Deal consensus evaporated.64 
Professor Geyh attributes it to the “Watergate mentality” of the last thirty 
  54. Bone, supra note 1, at 888. 
  55. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics 
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 802 (1991). 
  56. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997). 
  57. Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s 
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1996). 
  58. Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 
ALA. L. REV. 221, 226 (1997). 
  59. Yeazell, supra note 6, at 231. He adds that “[o]ver the last fifty years, the Rules have 
removed more and more of day-to-day procedure from judicial sight,” meaning that judges lack 
information about how the rules work. Id. at 241. 
  60. Id. at 236. 
  61. Id. at 235. 
  62. See Walker, supra note 56. 
  63. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
  64. See Walker, supra note 56, at 1286. 
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years,65 and Professor Bone more specifically attributes it to “the rise of 
procedural skepticism during the 1970s.”66 Professor Burbank places more 
emphasis on what the rulemakers themselves have done, including perhaps 
shooting themselves in the foot on occasion. Certainly, the drafters of the 
Evidence Rules might have done just that by including privilege provisions 
in their package of proposed rules, although they might be excused for failing 
to foresee that Watergate would cast such a harsh light on the provisions for 
executive privilege. More recently, as Professor Burbank notes, the 1983 
amendments, particularly the expansion of Rule 11, seem to have created a 
“poisonous environment” for rulemaking, and, at the same time, there has 
been some seeming “judicial overreaching” in connection with rulemaking.67 
More generally yet, Professor Resnik sees a pervasive loss of faith in the 
whole project of adjudication.68 
So also is there some diversity of views on the solution to the problems of 
contemporary rulemaking. Professor Geyh urges creation of an Interbranch 
Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary.69 Professor Burbank agrees, 
hoping that such an effort would establish new ground rules for spheres of 
authority.70 Professor Bone, on the other hand, urges that what we need is a 
new theory of procedural rulemaking to counter the impulse toward 
populism.71 Professor Walker contends for “fundamental review,” arguing 
that welfare reform, with its regime of enhanced local control and system of 
waivers of national requirements, along with mandatory research and use of 
incentives, could be an analogy for a useful reform package.72 Professor 
Yeazell, on the other hand, thinks that the solution lies in modifying the 
structure of rulemaking. He suggests that final rulemaking authority should 
be relocated to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
and that the advisory committees should be purged of judicial members 
(although judges would be allowed to serve on the Standing Committee).73 
In sum, although there is no agreement about what action should be taken, 
there is broad agreement that dramatic action must be taken if rulemaking is 
again to serve its purpose of providing desirable reform. 
  65. Geyh, supra note 57, at 1167. 
  66. Bone, supra note 1, at 891. 
  67. Burbank, supra note 58, at 227-28. 
  68. See Resnik, supra note 12. 
  69. See Geyh, supra note 57, at 1169. 
  70. See Burbank, supra note 58, at 246-50. 
  71. See Bone, supra note 1, at 918-47. 
  72. See Walker, supra note 56, at 1287-91. 
  73. See Yeazell, supra note 6, at 238-52. 
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III. ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY RULEMAKING 
To date, no such dramatic action has been taken. No commissions have 
been appointed, and the apparatus of rulemaking continues to function as it 
has for decades, tweaked by the 1988 amendments of the Rules Enabling 
Act.74 Meanwhile, some moderately controversial topics have been 
addressed. The Civil Rules on discovery have been revised, and another 
effort is under way to reform the class action rule. Both of these rulemaking 
efforts have generated a lot of attention, and less celebrated undertakings, 
such as a comprehensive revision of Rule 53, have also proceeded. 
This recent experience, which I have seen somewhat from the inside, 
suggests that contemporary rulemaking has a number of aspects that may not 
have been equally true of rulemaking during the Golden Age. Given the dire 
diagnoses of crisis and the aggressive prescriptions of some who seek to 
resolve that crisis, it seems useful to reflect on whether those aspects of 
current rulemaking show that things are worsening. In the process, we may 
be able to develop some insights on whether rulemaking can function as an 
engine of legal reform. Additionally, this canvas of current activities permits 
us to reflect on which of the introductory images seems best to correspond to 
what is going on. 
1. Top Down Versus Bottom Up 
Professor Friedenthal’s model of rulemaking was very much a top down 
version, and his concern was that the top level of the process—the Supreme 
Court—was not sufficiently engaged. One surmises that he thought this lack 
of top level engagement had adverse effects on both the content and the 
salability of the resulting rules. Certainly, the original rules represented a top 
down effort. However much the rulemakers interacted with others, they 
ultimately devised a new procedural system themselves. The Rules Enabling 
Act itself had not sanctioned any particular system,75 and it does not appear 
 74. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Tit. ix, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4648-52 (1988). 
  75. Although this is a fundamental point, it is somewhat difficult to support with a citation, 
perhaps because it is so pervasively accepted. True, the thrust of the Act was to create a uniform 
federal procedure. But the Act itself did not say what the uniform system would be. Thus, Professor 
Subrin devotes a lengthy article to chronicling the “revolutionary character of the decision inherent in 
the Federal Rules to make equity procedure available for all cases” and shows that this was a decision 
made by the rulemakers. See Subrin, supra note 10, at 913. And in his epic study of the Act, Professor 
Burbank points out that even after the Act was adopted, some of those who ultimately wrote the rules 
argued for continued conformity to state procedure. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1135-36 (1982) (describing articles by Professor Edson Sunderland, 
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that the rulemakers received other outside direction on what they should 
produce. In Professor Walker’s view, “[t]he original Rules are a strong 
example of centralization at the federal level.”76 
The top down method did not immediately sweep the day. Although the 
new pleading regime was meant to make a distinct break with the past, for 
years a number of district judges who favored more stringent pleading 
standards waged what has been called a “guerrilla attack” on the relaxed 
provisions of the Civil Rules.77 This insurrection was quelled finally only by 
a 1957 decision of the Supreme Court.78 On other topics, the procedural 
breakthrough of the rulemakers met with less resistance. Professor Subrin 
seemed surprised by the revolutionary nature of the discovery rules in his 
1998 reflection on the emergence of those rules,79 but that breakthrough 
seems to have achieved widespread support in short order.80 
The top down orientation seems out of place in the American 
arrangement described by Professor Kagan, which emphasizes the diffuse 
and localized nature of power in our polity. That may be particularly true of 
our courts; as Professor Damaska noted fifteen years ago, the U.S. court 
system relies on locally independent courts because it operates in a dispute 
resolution “reactive mode.”81 One might doubt that such tendencies toward 
local independence would disappear. 
They did not. Within a few years, local rules had blossomed, and a 1940 
study showed that they were quite numerous.82 Since that time, there have 
been recurrent efforts to contain local rulemaking. By the 1980s, Congress 
had become concerned, and, as a result, the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure launched a Local Rules Project to respond to the 
problem. In an action “radically at odds with one of the basic premises of 
who was ultimately a member of the Advisory Committee and chief drafter of the discovery rules). 
  76. Walker, supra note 56, at 1276. 
  77. RICHARD FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 524 (7th ed. 
1997). 
  78. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (stating that a complaint should not be 
dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim that would entitle him to relief”). 
  79. See Subrin, supra note 3. 
  80. By 1945, for example, the Third Circuit had recognized regarding discovery that “[t]he Rules 
probably go further than any State practice, but . . . . [w]e must start any discussion of the use of 
discovery in a particular case from the premise that the Rules are intended to go far in making 
information known by one party available to the other.” Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 
1945), aff’d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
  81. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 38, at 73-80 (describing the characteristics of “the reactive 
state”). 
  82. See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 969 (1940). 
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modern federal procedure,”83 Congress meanwhile prompted more vigorous 
local activity by passing the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) in 1990. The 
bottom up view of procedural revision seems irrepressible.84 
The recent reality, therefore, has been that the national rulemakers could 
not assume national compliance with their rules. One former Reporter of the 
Advisory Committee has likened the situation to a new Confederacy.85 The 
CJRA and the opt-out provisions inserted in 1993 reflect and somewhat 
reinforce this impulse. Perhaps partly because of the CJRA experience, the 
2000 amendments encountered heated opposition among many judges, and 
elicited during the public comment period some “love letters” from 
exasperated district judges. Perhaps some vehement examples, all from 
district judges, are worth quoting: 
 Judicial districts do not need solutions imposed from Washington. 
Judges in the field know best what works in their District.86 
 I recognize this as just the latest attempt to make us all alike, in my 
strongly held view very unwisely. . . . Fayetteville, Harrison, Fort 
Smith, Hot Springs, Texarkana and El Dorado, Arkansas, just aren’t 
like Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Boston, New York 
City, etc.87 
 [A]t a time when the federal government is promoting 
decentralization, this change from local option to a national standard 
in the federal courts appears to be an anachronism.88 
 [T]he entire tenor of the Advisory Committee’s report on this 
amendment reminds one of a parent’s rebuke of a wayward child. It is 
insulting to the district courts and was put forth in support of a change 
that has no justification except to serve the end of uniformity in and 
for itself.89 
  83. Burbank, supra note 58, at 230. 
  84. A chief aid to Senator Biden, chief sponsor of the CJRA, so described the goal of the 
legislation. See Jeffrey J. Peck, “Users United”: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 109-10 (1991). 
  85. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 929 (1996). 
  86. Comment 98-CV-130. I see no need to identify the judges quoted. These comments are on 
file with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
  87. Comment 98-CV-123. 
  88. Comment 98-CV-128. 
  89. Comment 98-CV-110. 
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In part, that emphasis on local initiative reflects the genuine creativity of 
some local judicial innovations. The entire case management movement, for 
example, was a bottom-up development originating in a number of 
metropolitan districts in the 1960s and 1970s. Only with the 1983 
amendment to Rule 16 did this activity find its way into the national rules; in 
that instance the national rules were in a sense used as a way of exporting the 
innovation of these metropolitan districts nationwide. Even then, districts 
were permitted to exempt certain categories of cases from the requirements 
of Rule 16(b). 
The Rule 16 experience is hardly the only one of this sort. Most recently, 
Rule 5(d)’s requirements for filing of discovery were amended in 2000 
because most districts had local rules that did not require the filing of 
discovery. Before that, a variety of other discovery features, including 
numerical limitations on discovery events and the required conference before 
a motion to compel, were added to the national rules based on experience at 
the local level.90 Even features of the initial disclosure regime adopted in 
1993 were based on local practice.91 
It is hard to say whether the original Advisory Committee operated 
entirely without concern about local innovations in practice. We are told that 
it circulated its proposals widely among the bench and bar,92 and it seems 
likely that local practices would have been among the things those who were 
consulted would mention. It is clear that local experience now has some role 
to play in fashioning the national rules. Some are even adapted to avoid 
interfering with local practice. Thus, in 2000, the timing requirements of 
Rule 26(f) were tempered to avoid disrupting those districts that moved so 
rapidly that the national minimum time limits might actually slow things 
down.93 At the same time, however, the initial disclosure and related 
requirements were made nationally binding by removal of the authority to 
opt out by local rule.94 Unlike the 1983 treatment of Rule 16(b), the 2000 
amendments do not authorize districts to exclude categories of cases from 
  90. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 783 
(1998) (detailing some of these provisions). 
  91. The early meeting of counsel included in Rule 26(f) was prompted by the model adopted in 
three districts that had earlier adopted a disclosure system by local rule. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 
809. 
  92. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
  93. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), which allows a district to accelerate events by local rule if 
“necessary to comply with its expedited schedule for Rule 16(b) conferences.” 
  94. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (initial disclosure); 26(d) (moratorium on discovery); 26(f) 
(required early conference of counsel to develop discovery plan). 
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these requirements. Instead, the rules themselves prescribe eight categories of 
excluded cases.95 
2. The Current Consultative Mode for Developing Amendment Proposals 
The need for attending to local practice suggests one element of recent 
experience in rulemaking. As noted above, the assurances that the original 
Advisory Committee fully vetted the new rules ring a little hollow to 
contemporary ears. We have been told that there was a period during the 
Golden Age of Rulemaking when early revelation of possible rule changes 
was not the mode.96 On the Advisory Committee’s own initiative,97 formal 
hearings on proposed rule changes were first held regarding the discovery 
rule proposals in 1978. A decade later, Congress mandated such openness by 
statute.98 Others continue to urge that such efforts be embraced.99 
There is much to be said for going beyond these ideas. Even the most 
open-minded of rulemakers might be tempted toward pride of authorship by 
the time formal proposals have been put before the nation. Floating formal 
proposals as a way of testing the water also seems unwarranted. More than a 
decade ago, Reporters of the committee began informal circulation of 
amendment ideas among people whose comments might be informative.100 
For the last decade or so, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has taken 
these concepts to heart. Judge Higginbotham may have originated the idea of 
doing so in a formal manner during his tenure as Chair of the Advisory 
Committee; at his behest a broad-ranging two-day conference in Dallas in 
early 1995 explored a variety of areas that might be the focus of future 
rulemaking.101 
  95. See Fed. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(E) (listing eight categories of cases excluded from initial 
disclosure, the discovery planning conference, and the moratorium on formal discovery). 
  96. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 164 
(1991) (reporting that the Advisory Committee Reporter during the 1960s “was instructed to keep his 
work entirely under wraps until the committee was prepared to make a recommendation”). 
  97. See Marcus, supra note 90, at 758 n.58 (reporting that this was the first time the Advisory 
Committee held public hearings on proposed amendments). 
 98. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2002) (requiring that rulemaking committees hold public meetings, 
with minutes, and provide a report with each rule change proposal).  
  99. See Yeazell, supra note 6, at 247-48 (urging “requiring the Advisory Committee to 
formulate, for each set of proposed Rules, a plan that would actively involve a cross-section of the bar, 
specifically identifying those whose views might be adverse to the proposed rules”). 
  100. I recall that Paul Carrington was doing this sort of thing as early as 1986 or 1987. Ed Cooper 
has continued the practice since then. In September 2002, I wrote to lawyers nationwide soliciting their 
views on potential rule changes to address challenges of electronic discovery. 
  101. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reporter, Conference on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1995) (reporting on proceedings of March 30-31, 1995, conference convened by the Advisory 
Committee in Dallas, Texas). 
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This trend has accelerated during the six years I have been associated 
with the Advisory Committee. The Committee has, during that time, 
organized at least five formal conferences: two on discovery generally, two 
on electronic discovery, and one on class actions.102 Each of these events 
included invited participants thought to reflect a range of viewpoints. Two 
have overtly drawn on bar groups to provide broader input as well. All have 
provided valuable insights to the Advisory Committee, including an 
opportunity for less formal interaction in addition to the formal conference 
sessions. 
In part, these interactions serve as an early warning system about potential 
difficulties with rule reform ideas. But they do more. Often nowadays, a 
critical consideration is how a given change will “work” with the practicing 
bar. Even a committee composed entirely of practicing lawyers might 
hesitate to make a confident judgment about that impact without some 
additional outside input. A committee composed substantially of judges can 
benefit even more. 
But this sort of interaction goes beyond providing early warnings about 
ideas the committee is considering because it can direct attention to topics the 
committee has not identified as important. Electronic discovery is an 
excellent case in point. Even though the Advisory Committee’s Discovery 
Project was conceived in 1996 as including consideration of all aspects of 
discovery, the committee itself did not identify electronic discovery as a topic 
for consideration. Rather, lawyers invited to comment on the problems of 
discovery during the 1997 sessions brought it up as an omission from the 
committee’s array of concerns, and then other lawyers mentioned these 
problems during the hearings on the actual proposals made in 1998. There 
was not time to learn enough about these issues to include provisions for 
them in the 1998 package of proposals, but the conference method was well 
suited to examining these questions and was used for the purpose on two 
  102. These were as follows: 
 January 16, 1997: Discovery miniconference in San Francisco to explore possible areas for 
amendment of the discovery rules with a number of lawyers and judges. 
 September 4-5, 1997: Discovery conference at Boston College to consider areas for possible 
amendments to the discovery rules. 
 March 21, 2000: Miniconference on electronic discovery in San Francisco to identify problems 
unique to discovery of computer-based materials with lawyers, judges, and technical experts 
 October 21, 2000: Miniconference on electronic discovery in Brooklyn, New York, to pursue 
questions about possible rule amendments to respond to concerns about discovery of computer-based 
materials with representatives of bar groups, lawyers, and judges. 
 October 21-22, 2001: Conference in Chicago with experienced lawyers and judges to consider 
current proposals for amending Rule 23 and other possible proposals for amending it to deal with the 
challenges of contemporary class actions. 
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occasions in 2000.103 
It is not always easy to arrange broad dialogue. For example, if one is 
interested in considering forfeiture issues, which are sometimes handled in 
proceedings governed by the Supplemental Rules originally added to deal 
with admiralty and maritime claims, how does one identify people who can 
speak for the interests of claimants in forfeiture proceedings? Despite those 
difficulties, it seems likely that the consultative mode will continue to be 
pursued. 
The Advisory Committee has recognized the value of this activity. 
Repeatedly, committee chairs have commented that they form an important 
ingredient in the “new model” of rulemaking that has emerged in the last 
decade. Whether this should be regarded as top down or bottom up, it is 
surely interactive at a point when proposals for amendment are in a formative 
stage, and the question whether rule amendment is advisable remains open. It 
is unclear whether committees focused on other sets of rules have often 
employed similar interactive methods,104 but advance consultation has 
assumed considerable importance in relation to the Civil Rules. 
3. Adding an Empirical Dimension 
Among other things it offers, the consultative mode can provide some 
quasi-empirical insights. But much of that information is necessarily 
anecdotal, and more disciplined information-gathering is often possible. In 
the past, it has sometimes seemed that there was insufficient interest in 
gathering such information,105 and in 1993 Professor Burbank even called for 
a moratorium on further rule changes until empirical information was added 
  103. See supra note 102. 
  104. In January 2002, I participated in panel discussion of class action issues for the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction that served a somewhat similar educational 
function, but that committee is not involved in rule amendment. 
 In a somewhat similar vein, the Working Group on Mass Torts appointed by the Chief Justice in 
early 1998 to study statutory and rule-based responses to the issues presented by mass tort litigation 
proceeded by convening conferences with a broad range of judges, lawyers, and academics to evaluate 
and develop possible legal changes to cope with mass tort litigation. For a comprehensive compilation 
of these efforts, see the appendices to REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION (Feb. 15, 1999). 
  105. See Mullenix, supra note 55. In this article, Professor Mullenix reviews the emergence of the 
proposal to mandate initial disclosure, which was eventually embodied in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), as 
adopted in 1993. She notes that “there is virtually no empirical study of the current practice of such 
informal discovery,” id. at 810, and describes her tentative efforts to gather some information 
regarding the experience in three districts that had adopted some form of early disclosure by local rule. 
See id. at 811-21. But when she relayed these results to the Advisory Committee at its November, 
1989, meeting, the committee declined to undertake any further study. See id. at 816 n.114. She 
recognizes as well that requests for empirical study “also serve to postpone solving the problem.” Id. at 
829. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p901 Marcus book pages.doc1/13/2003   1:06 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
920 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:901 
 
 
 
 
 
to the mix.106 
Considerable efforts have been made in this regard; in 1997 Professor 
Burbank noted that the judiciary “has come to recognize the value of seeking 
empirical data before formulating new or amended Federal Rules.”107 At 
least in connection with the review of the discovery rules, there was 
considerable effort to gather hard data. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) did 
a survey of the lawyers in 1,000 recently closed cases after consultation with 
the Advisory Committee in an effort to generate information about existing 
discovery problems and possible rulemaking reactions to them.108 In 
addition, at the request of the Advisory Committee, the RAND Corporation 
performed further analysis of the data it had developed in its assessment of 
the CJRA experience to determine whether insights about discovery practice 
could be gleaned from that data.109 
Together, these studies (and the prior RAND study of the operation of the 
CJRA) afforded some insights. It was apparent, for example, that those who 
had actual experience with initial disclosure found that experience positive. 
Although unable to demonstrate that early disclosure efforts had reduced 
costs or shortened litigation, the RAND Corporation study of CJRA 
programs showed considerable support in opinion surveys. About 60% of 
surveyed lawyers110 and over 78% of judges favored early disclosure.111 The 
Federal Judicial Center’s study of cases closed in 1996 found that, of those 
attorneys who reported an effect from initial disclosure, the effect was most 
often of the sort that disclosure was intended to foster. Thus, the percentage 
who found that disclosure caused the duration of litigation and cost of 
discovery to decline was more than four times as large as those who felt it 
had caused an increase in these factors.112 More than four times as many 
  106. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call For a Moratorium, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993). 
  107. Burbank, supra note 58, at 242. In the same vein, Federal Judicial Center researchers 
gathering data on discovery practices to assist the Advisory Committee in its 1996-1999 review of 
discovery began their report by noting that “the Committee requested this research before drafting 
proposals for change.” Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure 
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 526 (1998) (emphasis in 
original). 
  108. The survey produced the report published as Willging, supra note 107. 
  109. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998). 
  110. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 274 (1997) (reporting that in 1991 58% of responding lawyers said that 
early disclosure would be “generally desirable,” and that in 1993 65% so responded). 
  111. Id. at 261 (reporting that 78.2% of surveyed judges viewed early disclosure as “generally 
desirable”). 
  112. Willging, supra note 107, at 563. 
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lawyers reported that disclosure improved the procedural fairness of the cases 
than found the reverse, and six times as many attorneys thought that 
disclosure increased the prospects for settlement as thought that it lowered 
those prospects.113 Perhaps these attitudes explain another FJC finding—that 
initial disclosure was much more widespread than had been expected due to 
reports on how many districts had opted out of it.114 
At the same time, although recent experience may not have fully 
exploited the possibilities of empirical work,115 there are definite limits to the 
insights that can be gleaned for rulemaking purposes from empirical work of 
this sort. For example, there can be methodological disputes about different 
techniques for eliciting conclusions.116 Thus, even though social scientists 
may treat opinions as unreliable, rulemakers could find them useful in 
determining whether and how to amend the rules.117 Similarly, rulemakers 
may decide that conclusions that do not satisfy customary social science 
requirements are nonetheless important in determining whether rule changes 
would be desirable.118 As I have said in the past, rule changes might be 
justified on a showing that is less scientifically compelling than that required 
for the Food and Drug Administration to approve a new drug.119 
  113. Id. 
  114. See id. at 534 (reporting on “the unexpectedly high incidence of initial disclosure,” and that 
“more than a third of the attorneys in our sample who had engaged in initial disclosure had litigated 
their case in a district classified as having opted out”). 
  115. See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil 
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 112 (2002) (exploring ways in which different empirical 
research techniques can develop information useful to the rulemaking process). 
  116. For example, RAND found no relationship between early disclosure and reduced time to 
disposition, but the FJC did. Similarly, RAND found a reduction in time to disposition due to the use 
of early discovery cutoffs, but the FJC did not. See Willging, supra note 107, at 557-58. These 
differences may be due to the fact that RAND was looking at only twenty districts and was comparing 
district-wide medians, while the FJC was focusing on individual closed cases drawn from almost all 
districts. See id. at 558. But the divergent conclusions also underscore the difficulty of using these 
empirical techniques. 
  117. I have been told by at least one social scientist, for example, that surveys of lawyer opinion 
are not a legitimate basis for policy decisions because lawyers’ opinions about what techniques that 
reduce costs are not reliable. Instead, in this view, only gathering data on actual hours worked under 
different rule regimes and comparing those data can support confident conclusions. But at least a 
considerable number of social scientists would treat survey results as significant and “empirical.” 
Consider, for example, the 1997 FJC study of discovery, which largely relied on survey questions. See 
Willging, supra note 107. So there seems to be debate on this point in the social scientist community. 
  118. For example, the RAND study of the CJRA determined to a probability of 0.06 that a strong 
form of disclosure correlated to litigation savings, but the standard used for significant correlations 
was 0.05. See KAKALIK, supra note 110, at 201-02. The closeness of the results might be significant to 
rulemakers even though they are not significant to social scientists. 
  119. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 770 (asserting that “if procedural reform could only be adopted 
after being proved effective and safe in a manner similar to the way that the FDA determines whether 
a new drug can be sold, it seems unlikely that there would be any formal procedural reform”). 
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Two further points deserve note. First, empirical data may show that in 
most cases certain problems are not appearing. Opponents of rule changes 
may then argue that changes are not justified because they are not targeted at 
cases in which the problems arise. The empirical review of discovery in 
1997, for example, suggested that in most cases there were not serious 
problems with discovery. That conclusion does not lead necessarily to the 
further conclusion that rule changes should be limited to “problem” cases. 
Often it is impossible to define in a rule which cases are problems.120 If so, it 
may well be sensible to adopt rule changes designed to address the problem 
cases and apply them in all cases unless they will clearly cause new problems 
in the cases that were not formerly problems. 
The second point is more general: Much as empirical data are a desirable 
basis for rule changes, rulemakers cannot be blind to the reality that many of 
the current rules were adopted without much empirical foundation of the 
“hard data” sort described above. The framers working in the 1930s, though 
they may have been products of the Realist movement, did not have much 
solid empirical data on which to justify their conclusion that very substantial 
changes were needed to improve civil litigation, much less that their 
particular changes would accomplish good results. Indeed, it seems dubious 
that anything resembling the conference-style information gathering that is 
now in vogue attended that drafting process. As we have seen, their results 
were widely regarded as highly successful, suggesting that empirical 
foundations are not always an essential prerequisite to successful rulemaking. 
But it is also true that rules that were themselves not founded on empirical 
research might legitimately be displaced by later efforts only partly validated 
by such information. 
4. Rule Evolution through Judicial Interpretation 
Litigation itself can adapt, and to some extent reform, the application of 
procedural rules. It also can be viewed as a method for highlighting the need 
for changes in the rules. Quite a lot of time has passed since the rules were 
originally adopted in 1938, and many critical developments have occurred 
that revealed problems or affected the continued effectiveness of the rules. 
Because the rules were relatively open-textured by design, judicial 
interpretation has provided one method for adapting them. Sometimes it has 
seemed to be an alternative to formal amendment. While Hickman v. 
  120. See Marcus, supra note 90, at 777-78 (noting the difficulty of defining problem cases in a 
rule). 
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Taylor121 was pending before the Supreme Court, for example, the Court also 
had before it a proposal to amend the discovery rules to address the question 
of work product materials. The Court decided the case and did not adopt the 
amendment, and the rules did not overtly address work product for another 
twenty-three years.122 Sometimes rule reform can, in effect, occur without 
formal action by the rulemakers. 
However elastic some rule provisions and aggressive some courts, there 
are limits to this sort of activity. Around the time the Supreme Court was 
deciding Hickman v. Taylor, Charles Clark, by then a judge on the Second 
Circuit, reacted as follows to the majority’s ruling that Clark thought unduly 
constricted Rule 56 on summary judgment: “That is a novel method of 
amending rules of procedure. It subverts the plans and hopes of the 
profession for careful, informed study leading up to the adoption and to the 
amendment of simple rules which shall be uniform throughout the 
country.”123 
Whatever the reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision not to adopt rule 
revisions in 1947 to deal with work product,124 it has lately expressed 
misgivings with aggressive revision of rules by judicial interpretation.125 
Thus, when lower courts again began overtly developing more demanding 
pleading requirements for certain types of cases even though they did not fit 
within the heightened specificity requirements of Rule 9(b), the Court held 
that this could not be done even though it might be a good idea: “that is a 
result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal rules, 
and not by judicial interpretation.”126 
  121. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
  122. For a description of these events, see 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2021-22 (2d ed. 1994). 
  123. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
  124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
  125. Some question the Court’s seeming rigidity in sticking to the “plain language” of the rules 
rather than relying on the context and purposes they seek to serve. With rules, as opposed to statutes, 
the Court itself is the promulgator, and accusations of disregarding the policy choices of another 
branch due to relaxed emphasis on the strict wording of the rules ring rather hollow even though 
Congress does have a role in the rule-making process. Judge (then Professor) Moore therefore urged 
the Supreme Court to “do what it can do best—develop federal common law interpreting Federal 
Rules in light of their underlying policy and purpose on a case by case basis.” Karen Nelson Moore, 
The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 
1039, 1108 (1993). Although it is hard to disagree with Judge Moore’s point that this flexibility is 
better than more frequent rule changes, see id. at 1109, it may be harder to see it as a proper role for 
the lower courts, which must interpret the rules much more frequently than the Supreme Court, and 
which are not formally included in the promulgation of the rules. 
  126. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993) (asserting that imposing more stringent pleading requirements on claims against 
municipalities, though possibly desirable, “is a result which must be obtained by the process of 
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Clark’s objection has at least two components. First, judicial 
interpretation may respond to objectives that deviate from, or are even 
antithetical to, those sought by the rulemakers. The early rebellion against the 
relaxed pleading standards127 is an example of that phenomenon. The idea of 
rules is, in part, that they confine the latitude of judges.128 Perhaps the most 
pertinent recent example of that sort of thing is the rather emphatic 
disapproval that the rulemakers had in 1966 for use of Rule 23(b)(3) in even 
single accident mass tort class actions. Repeated judicial activism severely 
undermined that effort at restraint, and the Supreme Court seems to have 
buried it in 1997.129 
A second point is that judicial interpretation is likely to vary in different 
courts, thereby undermining the national uniformity that the rules were 
intended to achieve. Of course, it is inevitable that disagreements about 
interpretation of some rule language can result in differences in application 
by different judges, and therefore some regional disuniformity if different 
circuits reach different results. But that is magnified considerably if we invite 
judges to act as mini rule committees and shade their interpretations of the 
rules’ actual language to take account of the sorts of policy judgments a rules 
committee might conclude justify amending a rule. That is the province of 
the rulemakers, not of judges enforcing the rules. 
A third point that Clark probably had in mind is that individual judicial 
interpretation may be wrong more often than advisory committee action. 
Smart and wise as they are, judges can rely only on their own intelligence 
and wisdom and the arguments made for them by the parties. Rules 
committees draw on wider sources of information. This sort of problem is 
peculiarly resistant to solution through case law. Thus, rule committee action 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation”); cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 
U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with dissent that it would be desirable to 
uphold the proposed class action settlement in the case, but joining Court’s opinion overturning the 
settlement because Rule 23 does not justify that outcome as presently written, and “we are not free to 
devise an ideal system of adjudicating these claims. Unless and until the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are revised, the Court’s opinion correctly states existing law.”). 
  127. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
  128. There remains, of course, the ongoing debate on the extent to which rules should make 
confining judicial discretion their goal. For discussion, see Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1991-98. My point 
is only that rules that are designed to accomplish that result should not be interpreted to allow broad 
discretion. For discussion of “discretion to dismiss” as a view of the pleading rules, see Marcus, supra 
note 2, at 480-84. The question of whether it is desirable to write rules that confer discretion over 
certain matters raises different issues. 
  129. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (acknowledging the 
Advisory Committee note, but adding that “the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass 
tort cases from class certification, and District Courts, since the late 1970’s, have been certifying such 
cases in increasing number”). 
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will continue to be needed when judicial decision goes in the wrong 
direction. Recent concern about restrictive interpretation of Rule 15(c)(3) 
might fit this description.130 
On the other hand, rule evolution through judicial decision might have the 
advantage of being incremental by nature. “Real” reforms often go beyond 
incremental change. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that individual 
judicial decisionmaking could produce such innovations as the initial 
disclosure obligation first inserted into the rules in 1993.131 
In sum, whether or not judicial decisions themselves propel rule 
amendments, they are not a substitute for them. 
5. Rule Revision to Enact “Best Judicial Practices” 
A related consideration is whether rules should be amended to implement 
practices that judges have developed, whether by decisionmaking or simply 
as a matter of management of cases. Professor Leubsdorf, in his reflection on 
whether procedural change is a myth, somewhat disparaged such efforts: 
“Often . . . procedural reform simply puts the seal of legislation on changes 
that many judges are already implementing.”132 
As a starting point, it must be admitted that judicial activity “without 
benefit of rule” can and does occur, sometimes under claimed sanction of 
rule. Sometimes that sort of activity can go on for a long time. Decades of 
experience using special masters in ways not contemplated by Rule 53, for 
example, created a body of experience that ultimately caught the Advisory 
Committee’s attention.133 At least in that circumstance, recognition in the 
rule of what is happening in the nation seems hard to criticize, particularly if 
it can include specific directives on matters that may not always have been 
handled in the best way. Thus, there is now pending for action a proposed 
rewrite of Rule 53 that tries to do those things.134 
There may at least be a debate about whether it is desirable to write 
  130. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 266 F.3d 186, 200-03 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (urging 
consideration of amendment to Rule 15(c)(3) to respond to judicial interpretation of the rule). 
  131. Bottom up judicial innovation on the local rulemaking front can produce just this sort of 
innovation. At least some districts had some initial disclosure requirements in local rules at the time 
the Advisory Committee started looking at the question. See Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil 
Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 126 (1993) (reporting that some twenty districts had 
adopted initial disclosure). 
  132. Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 63. 
  133. For discussion, see Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 53: An Enabling Act Challenge, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1607 (1998). 
  134. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, Civil 
and Criminal Procedure and Rules of Evidence, 201 F.R.D. 560, 670-718 (2001). 
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judicially developed practice into rules frequently. Perhaps a good example is 
provided by the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which 
implements and explains the proper handling of the judge’s “gatekeeper” 
function in connection with expert testimony. The Supreme Court stepped 
into the area in its 1993 Daubert decision,135 and there have been quite a few 
decisions since then, including two more by the Supreme Court. The rule 
amendment attempted to make concrete the criteria that should be employed, 
and also to provide a Committee Note that gave some direction about how 
these criteria should be applied (including, perhaps, indications about which 
lower court cases should and should not be followed). 
This is a ticklish enterprise. Particularly with standards like these, which 
emerge from judicial decision, there may be concern about supplanting 
judicial development of that which judicial decision created. Thus, the 
Committee Note to Rule 702 emphasizes at the outset that “[n]o attempt has 
been made to ‘codify’ these specific factors.”136 There follows, however, a 
rather lengthy discussion of a variety of issues that might arise, illustrated 
with citations to decisions already interpreting or applying these factors. 
Should the rules process thus intervene into the decisional one? Clearly it 
can; rule changes can be made to “correct” mistaken judicial decisions137 (or 
simply to change legal rules). But it is not clear whether that was the purpose 
of the amendment to Evidence Rule 702, and some might contend that it is 
difficult to determine what is meant by a discursive “scholarly” Committee 
Note. On the other hand, the direction provided by a Note may be nearly as 
valuable to judges and lawyers as the rule itself. And the rulemaking and 
decisionmaking processes are not hermetically sealed. Indeed, in a 1999 
decision the Supreme Court itself cited the pending proposal to amend Rule 
702.138 
Unless rulemakers limit themselves to “breakthrough” reforms, the 
question whether there should be amendments to implement what at least 
some judges have already determined to be wise under existing, open-ended 
rules will recur. Some may object that this sort of change is not needed 
because experienced judges and lawyers are already doing what the 
amendment says should be done. Others can object that any change in the 
rule implies that there should be a change in practice, creating a risk that the 
  135. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 136. See Committee Note to 2000 Amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
  137. For example, the Committee Note accompanying the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c)(3) said 
that the rule “has been revised to change the result in Schiavone v. Fortune,” 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
  138. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156-57 (1999) (citing and quoting 
pending proposal). 
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very practices the rule seeks to encourage might be undermined. 
Yet, if the rulemakers can only tread where no judge has gone before, 
rulemaking will be a risky enterprise. And if they are to act on what they 
learn through interaction with practitioners, it may be that they can only do 
so by following the lead of some judges. One can readily see that the 
direction provided by a rule based on those insights, particularly if supported 
by a Note amplifying the points, could be of use to many judges and lawyers, 
even if not to those most knowledgeable in a given area. 
6. Rule Versus Note 
Here we descend to the truly prosaic. We have already mentioned the 
unhappy fate of the 1966 Advisory Committee Note on mass tort class 
actions.139 An ongoing question with regard to statutory interpretation is 
whether legislative history should matter. With procedural rules, that debate 
has a particular focus as applied to the Committee Note. Some courts 
certainly give considerable weight to the Note. The Third Circuit, for 
example, recently began its interpretation of a recent rule change by 
observing that “[t]he Committee Note is always a good starting point.”140 
Whatever the likelihood that the members of Congress who vote on 
legislation actually know what is in the legislative history, there is no 
question that in recent years many of those who vote on rule changes are 
aware of what is in the Note that accompanies the rule. Both the Advisory 
Committee and the Standing Committee spend quite a lot of energy on the 
Note.141 Lawyers do, too. Those who comment or testify about proposed rule 
changes often address themselves largely to the Note. Indeed, in recent years 
the Advisory Committee has often heard from lawyers who want the current 
committee to amend a Note that accompanied a rule amendment of the past 
without changing the rule itself. At least that contingency has been 
addressed; a Note can only be issued in conjunction with a rule 
amendment.142 But the overall practice has reached a point to prompt 
  139. See supra note 129. 
 140. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 529 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2001). Candor 
requires that I note that the author of this opinion was Judge Anthony Scirica, who has for several 
years served as Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.  
 141. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope 
of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 29 (2001) (“In my experience as a member of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the members and Reporters—as well as members of the public 
commenting on possible changes—devoted considerable attention to the explanatory notes as well as 
to the text of proposed rules.”). 
  142. This is a rule that is not necessarily written down even though it is adhered to. During the 
January 2002 meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, for example, there was a 
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Professor Struve to argue that a Committee Note should be given 
“authoritative effect.”143 
Perhaps partly in recognition of the importance of Note material, there 
has also recently emerged a debate about how far a Note should go. Some 
might even invert the limitation on changing a Note without a concomitant 
rule change to suggest that a rule change might be used as a vehicle for a 
Note that actually contains more substance than the rule itself. At least when 
rules implement judicial “best practices,” it may seem that the detailed 
explanation about what makes these practices best (along with illustrations) 
may be as important as the actual provisions of the rule. Should rulemakers 
be required to put their substantive preferences into the rule or leave them out 
altogether? As attention on rulemaking builds, that sort of question may be 
asked more often. 
7. Rules Versus Legislation 
A key element in the current concern about a rulemaking crisis is the 
increased willingness of Congress to take action on matters that are, or might 
appropriately be, the subject of rulemaking. At some level, this concern is 
likely to be important for the rulemakers. A decision to make rule changes 
might be said to open the door to legislative intervention because the 
occasion for that is an ingredient of the amendment process.144 A decision 
not to consider rule changes on a given topic despite legislative interest might 
prompt unilateral legislative action where the legislature would await, and 
discussion of the “internal committee rule” that “[a] note may not be changed unless a corresponding 
change is also made in the text of the corresponding rule.” Draft Minutes, Committee on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure, Jan. 10-11, 2002, Tucson, Az., at 21. Part of the explanation for this rule is that, 
as a form of legislative history, a Note reflects the intentions of the drafters at the time it is adopted. 
Another reason is that any change would be subject to the full Enabling Act process, else changes in 
the notes could effect a substantial revision of the rules without the scrutiny required in that process. 
 143. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002). She reasons that the Rules Enabling Act commands 
that the Committee Note must accompany proposed rule changes throughout the rule amendment 
process and that, “seen in the light of their creation—the Notes in some ways resemble the text more 
than legislative history.” Id. at 1158. Unlike the materials that constitute “legislative history,” she 
urges that “the active examination, and, at times, amendment of the Notes by the Advisory Committee 
and the Standing Committee, as well as the likelihood that the Notes receive scrutiny from at least 
some members of the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and (occasionally) Congress, indicate 
that those who considered and approved the text of the rule also considered and approve the 
accompanying Note.” Id. at 1159-60.  
  144. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” a Little More: Considering the 1998 
Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 261 (1999) (quoting warning to Advisory Committee by a 
former Senate staffer about making discovery revisions and sending them to Congress: “[I]f you tinker 
you always run the risk that Congress will totally ignore you and take on the reform and procedural 
issues itself.”). 
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hopefully be at least channeled by, rulemaking. 
Initially, the Advisory Committee’s concern might be labelled “turf 
protection.” Professor Burbank describes the Rules Enabling Act as a 
“treaty” between Congress and the rulemakers about which has first rights to 
act on certain subjects.145 At the outset, this sort of activity may provide good 
reason for the rulemakers to believe that they should go first on all topics that 
generally fall within their bailiwick. The judiciary, at least, describes the rule 
promulgation process as “perhaps the most thoroughly open, deliberative, 
and exacting process in the nation for developing substantively neutral 
rules.”146 From the perspective of the rulemakers, Congress does not match 
up: “[I]t is extremely rare for any product of the legislative process to receive 
such objective consideration, public input, and expert review.”147 
Despite that, Congress certainly has taken actions that appear to violate 
the treaty. The unilateral revision of Rule 35 to add examinations by 
psychotherapists is a frequently invoked example.148 That one prompted a 
rule revision in 1991 that more comprehensively (and carefully) dealt with 
the general question. Score one for the rulemakers. And yet Congress does 
not necessarily keep score that way. Indeed, some in Congress seem anxious 
to rub the rulemakers’ noses in the fact of their position of inferiority. For 
example, even as Rule 23(f) was headed toward implementation in 1998, 
bills before Congress sought to provide virtually the same thing.149 And some 
associated with congressional activity have bridled at awaiting or paying 
obeisance to the rulemaking process.150 
On other topics, the interaction has involved issues that are more 
debatable. An example might be litigation confidentiality, a topic on which I 
admit to strong views.151 For a number of years, some legislatures, including 
Congress, have looked hard at whether judicial protective orders in civil 
litigation contravene public safety concerns. Although that concern is surely 
one that Congress could legitimately view as beyond the seeming scope of 
rulemaking, it can also be argued that the importance of facilitating discovery 
  145. See Burbank, supra note 58, at 231 (referring to “the treaty we call the Enabling Act”). 
  146. Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed 
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 54 (2d printing 1995). 
  147. McCabe, supra note 51, at 1683. 
  148. See National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690 § 7047(b)(2), 102 Stat. 
4181, 4401 (1988) (amending Rule 35). 
  149. See Judicial Improvement Act of 1998, S. 2163, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 660, 105th Cong. 
(1998). 
  150. For example, an aide to Senator Biden spoke derisively of the “near mystical reverence of the 
rulemaking authority exercised by the Judicial Conference.” Peck, supra note 84, at 117. 
  151. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 
457 (arguing against broad view of “openness” of discovery). 
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is a topic of great importance in practice that could be furthered by protective 
orders. Accordingly, for a number of years the Advisory Committee studied 
the possibility of amending Rule 26(c) to address this question, and one 
proposed amendment got as far as a vote by the Judicial Conference, which 
sent it back for further study.152 Eventually, in March 1998, the Committee 
resolved that it was not going to take further action, and so informed 
Congress.153 Since then, legislative proposals have continued to be made, but 
legislation has not been adopted. 
Perhaps there will never be a clear dividing line between the province of 
Congress and the province (at least initially) of the rulemakers. But those 
concerned with effective litigation reform must recognize that sometimes 
rulemaking is not enough, even if Congress takes a restrained attitude. It may 
be that the current concern about the problems generated by overlapping 
class actions illustrates this situation. Some debate whether there really is an 
important problem. If there is, rule changes might be devised that could 
address the problem.154 But those rule changes might raise serious issues 
about whether the rulemakers have overstepped the line and tried to do 
something that they are not allowed to do.155 And it might be that the most 
effective solution would be to modify the rules regarding removal of class 
actions from state court to federal court, perhaps involving a body like the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in that process. That, of course, the 
rulemakers could never do under the current treaty. 
So collaboration rather than tension may be the best way to solve 
problems. Certainly there is much to be said for Judge Weinstein’s advice 
that pushing too hard on the divide between the legislative and rulemaking 
spheres threatens the entire enterprise.156 This potential tension will always 
be there, and the rulemakers may make things worse by blinding themselves 
to it. To some extent, they can probably avoid action that prompts Congress 
to press on the other side of the divide. But at some point it would undermine 
the rulemaking process to take action that appears unwise, or fail to take 
 152. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence, 163 F.R.D. 91, 124 (1995) (reporting that the Judicial Conference returned 
the proposed amendment of Rule 26(c) for further consideration). 
 153. See Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., March 16-17, 1998, at 38-39. 
  154. Ed Cooper, the Reporter of the Advisory Committee, has circulated a summary of possible 
changes to the rules to address these concerns that has received a good deal of commentary. See 
Reporter’s Call for Informal Comment: Overlapping Class Actions (Sept. 2001). 
  155. During the class action conference in Chicago in October 2001, procedure scholars disagreed 
about these questions. 
  156. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 78 (1977) (“It is 
the good sense to avoid intolerable conflicts by refusing to push the notion of independent branches of 
government to its logical conclusion that has made it possible for our government to survive.”). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/11
p901 Marcus book pages.doc1/13/2003   1:06 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] REFORM THROUGH RULEMAKING? 931 
 
 
 
 
 
action that is warranted, simply because of a feared congressional reaction. 
Controversy alone should not define the limits of rulemaking, an insight 
learned early on.157 Properly crediting the commentary on proposed 
amendments against that background is therefore one of the challenges of 
modern rulemaking. 
8. Reacting to Public Comment 
Whether or not the rulemakers of the past had sufficient outside input to 
guide them before they acted, modern rulemakers surely get a lot. Besides 
the fruits of the consultative mode,158 there are hearings and written 
comments to be absorbed and evaluated. It may be that the Committee’s 
handling of this material provides a counterpoint to congressional reaction to 
somewhat similar input. 
In this era of emphasis on the influence of special interests, many view 
Congress as focusing almost entirely on who is doing the talking rather than 
on the arguments being made. That must be an oversimplification, but 
Congress is supposed to be politically responsive. Although the 1988 
legislation opened up the rulemaking process to more input, it did not direct 
that the rulemakers be responsive in the same way. Thus, although some 
arguments seem to be couched in terms of the interest of the commenter,159 it 
is comforting to be able to say that such arguments are rare but unlikely to 
have much effect.160 Yet it is probably true that some organizational 
  157. Thus Edgar Tolman, a member of the original Advisory Committee, offered the following 
caution about the breadth of the committee’s authority to make procedural rules but not change 
substantive law: 
I think the greatest fallacy of all, the one that has manifested itself most clearly in the discussions 
of the question, is that when a provision of procedural law becomes important it thereby becomes 
substantive law because of its importance. 
Am. Bar Assoc., Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D.C. 31 (1938). 
  158. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104. 
  159. For example, the FBI submitted comments on a number of proposed amendments to the 
discovery rules including the change in scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1). On that topic, its 
entire statement was as follows: 
 The proposal to narrow the overall scope of discovery would seem to be favorable to the FBI. 
In the majority of cases brought against it, the FBI would seek little if any affirmative discovery 
from its opponent. In contrast, the FBI is very often the recipient of overly broad and 
unnecessarily intrusive discovery requests which go far beyond the issues which should be 
dispositive of the case. 
Comment 98-CV-214, at 4. The foregoing may be a good reason for the FBI to favor the rule change, 
and since it is a public law-enforcement body, that may be sufficient. But it is harder to see this sort of 
statement in general as a good argument to the Advisory Committee about adopting the scope change. 
  160. Carrington, supra note 96, at 165 (asserting that the committee will turn a deaf ear to 
genuinely selfish arguments). 
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commentators—perhaps “mainstream” bar groups would be an example—
are likely to be given special attention when they comment. Often the views 
of these organizations represent the cumulative wisdom of many lawyers, 
and often the organizations themselves have a track record of offering 
thoughtful and thorough comments. Beyond that, however, assessing public 
commentary is usually not a matter of counting noses. 
Public hearings are not trials, but many who appear bring their trial 
lawyer habits to the hearing setting. For one who has been away from the 
courtroom, this serves as a reminder of the amount of overstatement that 
often occurs in trials. Whether or not bluster is an effective technique in 
trials, it probably is not usually effective in rulemaking hearings, which more 
closely resemble appellate arguments. 
But one side’s overstatement can be telling when embraced by the other 
side. Consider the question whether the discovery scope defined in Rule 
26(b)(1) should be changed so that discovery regarding the “subject matter” 
involved in the litigation (as opposed to discovery relevant to the claims and 
defenses) could be obtained only for good cause. Many from the defense side 
asserted that the “subject matter” standard was no limit at all. We were told, 
for instance, that in automobile product liability cases judges would accept 
the argument that the subject matter of the suit was “how defendant builds 
cars.” That might be taken as overstatement from the defense side, but when 
the same position is adopted by the plaintiff side it could provide a reason for 
embracing change. Thus, it is interesting that one academic critic of the 
narrowing of scope quoted a plaintiff antitrust lawyer who urged the 
committee not to make the change as follows: 
In an antitrust context, if we were going about monopolizing oranges 
and we wanted to ask a question about grapefruits, it would not relate 
to the claim or defense, but it could relate to the subject matter of how 
do you conduct your business, what kind of contracts, agreements and 
restrictive practices do you engage in.161  
This sort of argument from the plaintiff side can lend credence to the case for 
change by overstating the status quo or implicitly supporting the conclusion 
that the current standard actually provides no limit on discovery. 
Another benefit of the hearing process is that it provides an advance 
sampler of the sorts of arguments lawyers are likely to make in court about 
what the rule changes mean that demonstrates that clarifications are 
  161. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 
ALA. L. REV. 529, 564 (2001). 
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necessary to make clear that the change is not intended to have that effect. 
Again invoking the discovery experience, a good illustration is provided by 
repeated statements about an asserted connection between the judicial 
authority to expand discovery to the “subject matter” limit and the proposed 
explicit authority to condition discovery on payment of costs in instances 
where the discovery exceeds the proportionality limitations of Rule 26(b)(2). 
Many lawyers, from both the defense and plaintiff sides, said that these 
changes were to work in tandem, and that judges who expanded discovery 
should routinely shift the costs of the expanded discovery to the party 
seeking it. But the two amendments were not thought to be linked; indeed, 
the good cause needed to justify broader discovery would seem in most 
instances to negate any objection on proportionality grounds. As a 
consequence, Committee Note language was drafted to negate this 
interpretation.162 
Public comment can also provide highly useful insight into experience 
under regimes like those proposed by the amendments. For example, another 
change included in the discovery amendments proposed in 1998 was limiting 
the duration of depositions to “one day of seven hours.” The Committee’s 
third hearing was in Chicago, and Illinois state courts have for some years 
had a three-hour limitation for depositions. It was striking that many lawyers 
who had lived under this rule were satisfied with it. Even some who had 
openly opposed the rule when it was proposed told the Committee that it 
worked.163 
Despite considerable, sometimes voluble, opposition during public 
hearings, controversial rule changes have recently gone forward and been 
adopted. Thus, although cringing before the threat to “take it to Congress” 
might show that the crisis in rulemaking has come home to roost, the recent 
reality of public comment has not had that flavor. Neither has it resembled a 
graduate seminar. But it has probably come a good deal closer to a seminar 
than many hearings in Congress, and adds an important dimension to 
responsible rulemaking. 
  162. See Agenda Item III-A, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, April 19-20, 1999, 
at 38-40. Ultimately, the Judicial Conference did not recommend adoption of the cost-bearing 
provision, so this Note language was dropped because the rule change was dropped. 
  163. See, e.g., testimony of Daniel Fermeiler, Trans. of Jan. 19, 1999, public hearing at 188-93 
(reporting that he was president of the defense bar when the Illinois rule was proposed, and that he 
spoke against the change at that time, but now that he has lived under the rule, he can report that it 
works). 
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9. Third Branch Grass-Roots Reaction 
A specialized aspect of commentary on rule changes is grass-roots 
judicial reaction. Like other interested parties, some judges may have strong 
views on issues considered in rulemaking. Unlike others, they are in a 
particularly effective position to be heard because approval by the Judicial 
Conference is one step in the rule amendment process. District judges 
constitute nearly half the members of that body.164 
Judges understandably care deeply about rule changes that directly affect 
their daily activities. At times, they vehemently assert their right to do things 
their own way.165 There is some reason for concern about the impact of 
judicial resistance to rule change. Consider Judge Higginbotham’s 
description of the effort to increase the size of juries: 
Our Rules Committee tried desperately to get back to the 12-person 
juries, the Advisory Committee adopted it, the Standing Committee 
adopted it, but the Judicial Conference opposed it, because the district 
judges didn’t want to lose the authority to themselves decide whether 
it would be six or 12.166 
Experiences like this understandably prompt caution among rulemakers, 
and may justify Professor Yeazell’s reaction that “[t]his is not the way to 
make procedural rules.”167 But widespread opposition among district judges 
does not necessarily spell doom for proposed changes. Consider the abolition 
of opt-outs regarding initial disclosure. According to comments, a significant 
proportion of all district judges went on record opposing the change, but it 
was nonetheless adopted. 
IV. IS REFORM POSSIBLE THROUGH CONTEMPORARY RULEMAKING? 
Perhaps the foregoing catalogue of issues raised in current rulemaking 
will persuade some that it is a toothless remnant of the vital rulemaking 
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2002) provides that the chief judge of each circuit is a member of the 
Judicial Conference, as is the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, and that a district judge 
from each circuit shall be a member of the Judicial Conference, also. Because the Chief Judge of the 
Court of International Trade is a member of the Judicial Conference, district judges constitute a 
minority of that body. The Chief Justice presides at the meetings of the Judicial Conference and could 
by voting on matters pending before the Conference further dilute the voting power of the district 
judge members if they all agree about a matter before the Conference.  
  165. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89 (comments on abolition of opt-outs for initial 
disclosure). 
  166. Am. Law Inst., Remarks and Addresses, 78th Annual Meeting 29 (2001). 
  167. Yeazell, supra note 6, at 234 (discussing the fate of the twelve-person jury). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/11
p901 Marcus book pages.doc1/13/2003   1:06 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] REFORM THROUGH RULEMAKING? 935 
 
 
 
 
 
process that existed during the Golden Age. An important starting point in 
making such a determination is to decide what really matters. A recurrent 
feature of the public hearing process is the bombastic prediction that a 
change will have cataclysmic significance. A member of the Standing 
Committee, for example, asserted that the Rule 26(b)(1) change in the scope 
of discovery was “the most radical change in the civil rules in 60 years,”168 
and an academic commentator predicted that the scope change was “likely to 
be an inefficient disaster.”169 Similar assertions abounded in the public 
commentary process. 
Frankly, the scope change was a modest one, and the new scope of 
discovery is extremely broad by the measure of any other country.170 Indeed, 
one might even argue that the change was not a good idea because it was so 
modest. Of course, it is difficult to determine what effect such a change has 
on activity that is quite difficult to monitor. But it is interesting to report the 
early returns found by Professor Rowe, who as a member of the Advisory 
Committee was one of the strongest opponents of the rule change. 
Investigating the actual effect of the amendment in reported cases, he found 
that in almost all of the cases the outcomes were the same under either 
version.171 Based on these early returns, he concluded that “it does not appear 
that the sky has fallen or that it will probably do so,” and that this amendment 
did not create a “growth industry” as did the amendment of Rule 11 in 
1983.172 Already, some courts under the new rule are saying that “[t]he scope 
of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil procedure is well-
established.”173 So this change illustrates the phenomenon of overstatement 
and not the power of rule change. 
In my opinion, the truly important change to the rules in 2000 was the 
abolition of the opt-out provisions because it took a substantial step toward 
restoring the national uniformity of procedure under the rules. Admittedly, 
that was a kind of a negative accomplishment because it removed the 
authorization to deviate that was introduced in the 1993 amendments, 
something of a self-inflicted wound that is explained by the peculiar 
  168. These comments are quoted in Marcus, infra note 170, at 183 n.168. 
  169. Stempel, supra note 161, at 531. 
  170. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First 
Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153 (1999) (arguing that the 
pending discovery changes in the United States would not significantly move it toward the attitude of 
the rest of the world on the proper scope and intensity of discovery, and that American discovery 
would still seem anathema to the rest of the world). 
  171. See Rowe, supra note 141. 
  172. Id. at 22, 33. 
  173. Lovato v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 200 F.R.D. 448, 449 (D. Colo. 2001). 
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circumstances of the 1991-1993 period. 
In 1993, of course, the major trauma in rulemaking was about initial 
disclosure. Like the 2000 scope change, it was an idea that some asserted was 
revolutionary: a replacement for discovery and a rejection of a major plank of 
the revolution of 1938.174 Perhaps it was favored by some with remarkably 
zealous views about drawbacks of adversary discovery, but it was ultimately 
a rather modest change that most lawyers and judges who used it came to 
favor fairly quickly.175 The big change that year, in my view, was the 
addition of Rule 26(a)(2) with its comprehensive requirements for 
disclosures about testifying experts. This change was significant in part due 
to case law developments fortifying the judge’s role as gatekeeper of expert 
testimony.176 It should not be surprising that it has generated a large number 
of decisions about the adequacy of disclosures and the consequences of 
failure to make adequate disclosure.177 And yet it slipped through with hardly 
a mention during the tumult about initial disclosure. 
The level of commotion about a rule change is therefore a poor barometer 
of the actual importance of the change. Indeed, essentially the same change 
can produce a moderate firestorm one time and no reaction another. In 1978, 
for example, a proposed amendment to Rule 5(d) was published that would 
have eliminated filing of certain discovery materials.178 This proposal 
provoked opposition,179 and eventually a more modest amendment was 
substituted, authorizing orders relieving parties from filing discovery 
materials in specific cases. Even this limited change prompted adverse 
commment. The New York Times denounced it in an editorial,180 and 
prominent members of Congress wrote expressing their uneasiness about 
it.181 
  174. Consider the views of one district judge (perhaps sympathetic to the idea) as the controversy 
was swirling: “Some observers of civil litigation believe that discovery rights will be taken from 
lawyers within the next decade or two, to be replaced by a system of standard disclosures.” Wauchop 
v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 199, 200 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
  175. See supra note 110-14 and accompanying text. 
  176. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. 
  177. See 8 Fed. Prac. & Pro. § 2031.1 (Supp. 2002) for descriptions of many of these cases. 
  178. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 
F.R.D. 613, 622 (1978) (directing that discovery materials not be filed until used in the proceeding). 
  179. E.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the High Cost of Litigation to the Seventh 
Circuit Judicial Committe and the Bar Association of the Seventh Federal Circuit, 86 F.R.D. 267, 284-
85 (1979) (opposing elimination of the requirement that discovery materials be filed). 
  180. See Paper Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1980, at A18 (asserting that the amendment would 
give judges “the power to prevent public access to a huge number of documents that now belong in the 
record”). 
  181.  Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote to the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts expressing the Committee’s concern “about 
the possible harm which could result to interested parties and the general public from improper 
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In 2000, Rule 5(d) was amended to do exactly what the initial 1978 
proposal sought to do, and there was essentially no reaction at all. In part, this 
silence in 1999-2000 may have been due to the reality that most district 
courts had already adopted such provisions by local rule, but the contrast is 
nonetheless rather striking, the more so in comparison to the controversy that 
swirled around a 1995 proposal to amend Rule 26(c) regarding protective 
orders. Already, courts are citing the 2000 change to Rule 5(d) as weakening 
arguments for nonparty access to discovery materials.182 
How then to assess the potential and effect of rulemaking as a source of 
real reform? Perhaps a helpful start comes from returning to the three 
perspectives suggested at the outset. Considering first Professor Friedenthal’s 
hope that the Golden Age could be restored by renewed involvement of the 
Supreme Court, it seems clear that has not occurred. Whether it could ever 
have restored the top-down apparatus that seemed to explain the great 
success of rulemaking as a device for reform during the Golden Age, the 
Court has kept its distance, most remarkably in 1993.183 
Indeed, it may be that the ability of rulemakers to dictate aggressive 
reform during the Golden Age was a consequence of unusual features of the 
time, perhaps features linked to the New Deal.184 The model of a group of 
experts, largely insulated from external and “political” pressures, has not 
been the norm for American policymaking across a variety of topics. Perhaps 
it draws more closely on the political experience of other nations. Compare 
the recent reforms of procedure in England, which were produced somewhat 
implementation of amended Rule 5(d),” and asking for a report back after a year on the actual 
experience. See Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy to William Foley, Director, Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts, July 29, 1980 (on file with author). Mr. Foley responded, reassuring Senator 
Kennedy that nonfiling orders should be entered “only when the court has determined that it is 
unlikely that the proceeding will be of interest to the general public.” Letter from William Foley to 
Sen. Edward Kennedy, Aug. 26, 1980 (on file with author). 
 Representative Robert Drinan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House 
Judiciary Committee, wrote to the Deputy Director of the Administrative Office to convey his 
concerns about the amendment to Rule 5(d). See Letter from Rep. Robert Drinan to Joseph Spaniol, 
Deputy Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, June 24, 1980 (on file with author). 
  182. Thus, the Second Circuit rejected arguments based on one of its earlier cases because that 
earlier case “relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) to find a statutory right of access to 
discovery materials, [and] the recent amendment to this rule provides no presumption . . . let alone 
public access to them. Indeed, the rule now prohibits the filing of certain discovery materials unless 
they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing.” S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 
n.11 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). 
  183. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist was notably standoffish when he transmitted the 1993 change: 
“While the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal does not 
necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form 
submitted.” Letter of Transmittal, William H. Rehnquist to Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
April 22, 1993, 146 F.R.D. 403 (1993). 
  184. Cf. Walker, supra note 56. 
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singlehandedly as a result of the careful study of Lord Woolf,185 who seems 
to aspire to the sort of breakthrough said to have typified our Golden Age of 
Rulemaking.186 Although cross-cultural comparisons and generalizations 
about other legal systems are hazardous, there does seem to be some reason 
to think that procedural reform on the Continent is the preserve of somewhat 
more sheltered academics even though it ends up in legislation. Perhaps this 
flows from a different orientation toward the legal system on the Continent, 
which we are told is more dominated by law professors.187 In any event, in 
contrast to the profusion of writing in this country on the process of 
rulemaking, there is little—at least in English—on the comparative effort in 
the Continent, so that further examination of this comparison must await 
further work. 
Turning to Professor Leubsdorf’s ruminations about the myth of 
procedural reform, one could find some confirmation of this thesis. Certainly, 
the significance of the recent procedural changes is far eclipsed by the 
ballyhoo accompanying them and often contradicts the loud forebodings. 
Initial disclosure did not supplant formal discovery, cause a revolution, or 
undermine the adversary system. The CJRA did not produce a “revolutionary 
redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power,”188 although it contributed 
to fortifying trends toward local autonomy that have been somewhat 
countermanded by the 2000 amendments. The modest recalibration of the 
scope of discovery in 2000 has not produced major effects and is not likely to 
do so. 
The changes that are significant are hardly earth-shaking. Expert 
disclosure is an important feature of lawyers’ lives, but substantial discovery 
regarding experts was generally done before 1993. The initial conference of 
counsel introduced in Rule 26(f) in 1993 and made nationally required in 
  185. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996). 
  186. Thus, Professor Jolowicz reports that Lord Woolf said in a speech that the former procedure 
of the English courts would be of “historic interest” only once the new one was up and running, and 
that old precedents would “mislead rather than inform on the new position.” J.A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL 
PROCEDURE ix (2000). Professor Jolowicz doubts, however, that Lord Woolf was serious, noting that 
“[e]ven the French Revolution could not produce a truly radical civil code.” Id. 
  187. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 65 (1969) (“In civil law 
jurisdictions, the way legal scholars look at the law is the way everyone looks at it.”). This orientation 
may result in part from a less pragmatic system of legal education, which focuses more on legal 
abstractions. See Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217, 264 (1992) (suggesting that American class 
actions are incomprehensible to Continental lawyers because Continental lawyers “focus [on] what 
exists in the codes and not the problems which exist in society”). 
  188. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 
379 (1992). 
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2000 is reportedly often a useful organizing device but not an earth-shaking 
addition to the judicial management activities that flowed in the wake of the 
1983 amendments to Rule 16(b), which were themselves building on judicial 
activity that occurred without the prodding of a national rule. 
So by and large Professor Leubsdorf’s myth seems to be borne out. 
Perhaps the contrast of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA)189 experience underscores the point and suggests that if “real” 
reform is sought today, it must come from Congress. This is not the place, 
and I am not the person, to provide a judgment on whether that statute 
produced real reform.190 Certainly, the amount of attention that legislation 
has received indicates that it has had important effects. Whether it produced 
the effects desired is less clear. The Economist recently published a chart, for 
example, indicating that the number of securities fraud class actions 
quadrupled during the period from 1996 through 2000.191 Congress itself 
seemed to recognize that the original legislation did not achieve its full 
effects when it passed further legislation in 1998. 
In a significant respect, this development casts an ironic light on some 
recent scholarship endorsing substance-specific procedure.192 It seems that 
the notion underlying this argument for departing from the transsubstantive 
ideal was partly that judicial interference through procedure had hobbled the 
enforcement of substantive law adopted by Congress. Perhaps the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act was an example of legislative efforts that serve this sort of 
purpose; revision of procedural means could be included in the mix even if 
that involves undercutting the rulemakers.193 The PSLRA, ironically, seems 
 189. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) 
(codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 190. Others have tried to assess the impact of the Act. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Did the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (surveying 
effectiveness of Act based on database of 1449 class actions filed between 1996 and 2001, and 
concluding that the legislation did not work as intended because the rate of filing of class actions 
continued as before, although there is evidence that overall case quality has improved); Joseph 
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity I 
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002) (examining the ambiguities of the 
PSLRA rules on pleading in view of lower court interpretations). 
  191. See Face Value: In a Class of His Own, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2002, at 56. The cause for 
this increase in filings seems to be external to the litigation system. Thus, Jonathan D. Glater, 
Recomputing Earnings With Lawbook and Eraser, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at C8, also offers a chart 
showing considerable growth in securities class actions filings but explains that this increase 
corresponds with a big increase in restatement of corporate earnings. 
  192. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801, 813 (1992) 
(“Congress should amend certain federal rules of civil procedure, making the rules more responsive to 
the needs of civil rights plaintiffs.”). 
  193. But it is worth noting that aspects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 may have backfired. See 
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that changes in discrimination 
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to represent an effort by Congress to change procedure to restrict 
enforcement activity that had developed in the courts. It surely shows that 
Congress may tinker with procedural rules otherwise governed by the 
rulemakers in order to have the desired effect on substantive enforcement. 
But it also demonstrates that Professor Carrington was right to emphasize the 
dangers of substance-specific procedure, for that sharpens the involvement of 
those able to influence the political branches to obtain the desired procedures 
for “their” cases.194 
Yet the PSLRA surely has, for good or ill, had some considerable effects. 
As one court recently noted, its lead counsel provisions created “significant 
federal rights that previously did not exist.”195 Whether or not those are the 
sort of rights that the rulemaking process can properly create,196 it is hard to 
cite a similar breakthrough due to rulemaking in recent decades. Perhaps 
Rule 11 would come closest,197 and the Rule 11 experience is not necessarily 
one that the rulemakers will want to repeat soon. 
But as Leubsdorf himself notes, procedural breakthroughs are rare events 
and meaningful reform need not depend on changes of that magnitude. 
Because rulemaking has produced some noteworthy changes recently, it 
seems capable of further changes of that dimension, albeit not of the 
dimensions accomplished during the Golden Age. Those breakthroughs, 
indeed, may be off limits because they have been absorbed into the American 
litigation psyche. As Professor Hazard has recently argued, broad party-
controlled discovery has achieved almost constitutional stature in this 
law effected by the Act precluded certification of a plaintiff class in an employment discrimination 
action); Lesley Frieden Wolf, Note, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1849 (2000) (describing challenges to class 
certification under new Act, and noting that “[u]nintentionally, Congress may have created an 
insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs seeking class certification for discrimination claims”). 
  194. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An 
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 
(1989) (cautioning about likely effects of confining procedural change to specific substantive areas 
because that would prompt efforts by those affected to influence content of revised procedures). 
  195. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 263 F.3d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
injunction against state court proceedings in order to give effect to this right). 
  196. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980), says that, for purposes 
of the personal stake requirement to avoid mootness, a “procedural claim, such as the right to represent 
a class,” remains even after the substantive claim has expired. One might liken this to the lead plaintiff 
rights created by the PSLRA. 
  197. Justice Kennedy argued in Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 
498 U.S. 533 (1991) that the rule “creates a new tort of ‘negligent prosecution’ or ‘accidental abuse of 
process.’” Id. at 567 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). The majority, however, found the rule within the 
rulemaking power because it was reasonably necessary to the integrity of the federal court system so 
that any “incidental” effect on substantive rights did not matter to its validity. 
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country.198 As a consequence, modifications of the discovery regime do not 
question the fundamental commitment to providing the parties latitude in 
evidence development that has no parallel in the rest of the world.199 Perhaps 
similarly, it has been suggested that the 1966 adoption of expanded class 
action provisions so altered American litigation that it cannot now be taken 
back by rulemaking.200 
On balance, then, it may be that Professor Kagan’s more general analysis 
is most pertinent to assessing the ongoing capacity of the rulemakers to 
accomplish reform. That analysis emphasizes the diffusion of authority that 
traditionally has characterized governmental activity, and the tendency of 
American adversarial legalism, to rely on rights-based presentations by 
contending interests. In addition, it emphasizes the diffusion of governmental 
power, particularly to local courts. 
Together, these forces have produced the sorts of impediments to action 
that seem to characterize difficulties with using rulemaking to accomplish 
aggressive reform. Consider Kagan’s description of the distinctive American 
approach to developing regulatory regimes: 
Many governments seek to manage the political struggle over 
regulatory standards by entrusting regulatory decisions to technocratic 
bureaucracies, largely shielded from political and legal 
interference. . . . The United States, in contrast, strives to subject the 
political struggle over regulatory policy to the constraints of legal 
rationality, which gives both regulated businesses and proregulation 
advocacy groups yet another set of weapons to foil regulatory 
decisions that they may dislike. 
 The U.S. administrative process for making regulatory policy, 
accordingly, is distinctive in its legal formality, its openness to interest 
group participation, its adversarial quality, and its subjection to 
judicial review. American statutes and court decisions insist on 
publication of draft regulations, followed by open hearings in which  
  198. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694 
(1998) (“Broad discovery is thus not a mere procedural rule. Rather it has become, at least for our era, 
a procedural institution perhaps of virtually constitutional foundation.”). 
  199. See generally Marcus, supra note 170. 
  200. See Mullinex, supra note 55, at 836 n.210 (reporting that Paul Carrington, then Reporter of 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, “suggested that the 1966 amendments to rule 23 now would 
probably be impossible to revise through the Advisory Committee processes because of the perceived 
political implications of such a rule revision”). 
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advocacy groups, business organizations, and other interests may 
present their critiques and demands.201 
Surely the Golden Age of procedural rulemaking did not look that way, 
while in the current era rulemaking has such features. That may be the 
“crisis” of rulemaking. But the current era has also seen a major upsurge in 
American adversarial legalism.202 It would perhaps be odd were procedural 
rulemaking spared from the pervasive American orientation toward this sort 
of activity. From this perspective, one might say that the Golden Age of 
rulemaking was really out of step with general American legal traditions, and 
that its eclipse in recent decades is entirely in keeping with the more general 
upsurge of adversarial legalism during that period. Certainly many features 
of contemporary rulemaking resemble the aspects of American government 
that Professor Kagan describes, such as the recurrent paralysis of attempts to 
achieve change, the receptivity of the governmental structure to bombastic 
challenge, the ability of local actors to defy the central authority, and the 
overall resistance to granting power to, or perhaps even reposing trust in, 
experts who are entirely free of political influence. 
If that analysis is correct, the current trends and future prospects for 
rulemaking seem to be in keeping with much broader currents in American 
society. One might even say that the mid-century freedom of the giants who 
framed the original Civil Rules to impose a new order on American 
procedure was the exception that needs explanation, not the return to more 
familiar circumstances of politically contested stasis. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much to be said in favor of a regime that confers procedural 
rulemaking authority on a band of experts who can carry out dramatic reform 
when that is warranted.203 Perhaps that is what those who want to convene a 
  201. Kagan, supra note 31, at 188. 
  202. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 203. Indeed, a recent article urges that the rulemaking model is so good that it should be employed 
to develop a comprehensive set of canons of statutory interpretation: 
 Statutory interpretation is, in many ways, a field like civil procedure, or criminal procedure, 
or evidence. Like evidence and procedure, statutory interpretation was an area of judicial 
expertise. And like evidence and procedure, statutory interpretation was long assumed the 
exclusive province of the judiciary. On the other hand, all three fields demand, above all, 
internally coherent and consistent codes. These are notoriously hard for judges to develop case by 
case, and after years of effort, the results have been unsatisfactory. 
 In the fields of evidence and procedure, an innovative solution has been discovered: the 
federal rulemaking process. This process combines the expertise of the courts with the democratic 
legitimacy of Congress. It has harnessed the strengths of both branches and led, through 
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commission to hammer out a new consensus204 hope would emerge. But in 
the American tradition, that new consensus, even if confected, is not likely to 
last. So those who thought that the midcentury success of top-down reform 
would persist were likely to be disappointed.205 Even science, we are told, 
confronts the risk of succumbing to a process of politicization. Because 
science is frequently invoked in political debates—often about the 
environment—the impartiality of scientific research may be threatened. At 
least one leading scientist has recently warned that “[p]oliticization of 
science has always been, and always will be, integral to political 
advocacy.”206 “Science is becoming yet another playing field for power 
politics, complete with the trappings of media spin and a win-at-all-costs 
attitude. . . . There is little sense in yearning for a bygone era when science 
was construed as ‘value-free.’”207 
In this climate, some surely have aspirations for rulemaking that outstrip 
its capacity to deliver. One professor, for example, believes the Golden Age 
produced “the open courts and access to justice that was Twentieth Century 
law’s greatest achievement.”208 Anyone who expects rulemaking to produce 
breakthroughs of this magnitude in the new century is going to be 
disappointed unless a dramatic change occurs. Whether this constitutes a 
crisis can at least be debated. At the same time, the forecasts of doom seem 
too dire. Rulemaking no longer operates with the elan that prevailed during 
the Golden Age. I share Judge Winter’s frustration that “even amendments 
best characterized as trivial or incremental may encounter enormous 
resistance.”209 But rulemaking has not been entirely hobbled. And the 
difficulties that now attend even modest changes do not necessarily show that 
collaboration, to the creation of coherent, unified codes: Federal Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 
These successes should be replicated, in Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation. 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 
2088-89 (2002). 
  204. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
  205. As Professor Subrin has noted, the 1930s experience is unlikely to be repeated: 
I believe it was Professor Hazard who pointed out to me many years ago that the legal profession 
has become so decentralized and diverse that it is unlikely in the extreme that a relatively small 
group of lawyers, many of whom knew each other in advance, could sit in a room and create an 
entirely new procedure for the entire country as was the case in the 1930s. 
Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: 
The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1997). 
  206. Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Policy, Politics and Perspective: The Scientific Community Must 
Distinguish Analysis from Advocacy, 416 NATURE 367, 367 (2002). 
  207. Id. at 368. 
  208. Stempel, supra note 161, at 637. 
  209. Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 263 
(1992). 
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there is a crisis so much as that the conditions of American adversarial 
legalism that pervade legal institutions in our society affect the rulemakers as 
well. Maybe rulemakers should largely be preoccupied with the sorts of 
concerns that are enumerated above.210 In any event, it seems likely that, in 
the future, they will focus largely on such concerns, and that major 
breakthroughs are accordingly unlikely to result from rulemaking. 
Nonetheless, the Republic—and the courts—will probably survive. 
  210. See Part III. 
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